As with most presidential elections, South Korean voters predominantly voted their pocketbooks in Tuesday’s national election.
While the election featured the usual struggle between a conservative market-based growth strategy and liberal redistributionism, voters this time were driven in large part by a desire to end their nation’s endemic political corruption.
After 10 years of conservative presidency—South Korean presidents serve a single five-year term—it seemed a foregone conclusion this year that the pendulum would swing to a liberal candidate.
This natural trend was reinforced by the impeachment of conservative President Park Geun-hye, who abused her power by colluding with a friend to fleece the country’s large conglomerates.
Moon Jae-in, a left-of-center candidate, handily won the election. He previously served as chief of staff to President Roh Moo-hyun, whose term was marked by tense relations with Washington over policy differences on North Korea, as well as Roh’s demand for more autonomy in the alliance.
During the campaign, Moon tacked to the center on national security issues to gain conservative votes, but it remains uncertain how he will actually implement his foreign and security policies.
He has described himself as “America’s friend” and said that the U.S. alliance is the “most important foundation for our diplomacy and national security.”
Yet Moon also advocates being able to “say no to the Americans,” strengthening South Korea’s independent defense capabilities, and regaining wartime operational control of South Korean military forces from the United States. Currently, control of South Korean military forces will be turned over to the U.N. commander (always a U.S. general) when the two presidents decide a state of war exists.
He called for South Korea to “take the lead” on Korean matters rather than taking a back seat as the U.S. and China discuss North Korean policy.
Moon is no doubt looking to resurrect many of Roh’s liberal policies, yet North Korea’s increased belligerence since Roh’s presidency may constrain how vigorously he pursues unconditional engagement with Pyongyang.
Some South Korean experts believe North Korea’s hostile actions in recent years—its development and testing of nuclear weapons, its attacks on South Korea in 2010, and its recent assassination of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s half brother—have erected a “wall” that will prevent Moon from moving too far left.
Other pundits reject that out of hand, saying that “if a wall exists, Moon will jump over it or dig under it so he can be as far left as Roh.”
While Moon originally opposed the U.S. deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense system in South Korea, he shifted during the campaign to sitting on the fence, saying he was “open to both possibilities” (of deploying or withdrawing THAAD) and would “pass the issue to the next government.”
He favors maintaining South Korea’s own missile defense system independently from the broader allied network.
Moon sees economic engagement with North Korea as a means of bringing the north back to the negotiating table and eventually achieving “economic unification” of the two Koreas. Rather than making North Korea make the first concession to resume denuclearization negotiations, he said he would “try to make both North Korea and the U.S. act simultaneously.”
Moon also advocates reopening the Kaesong joint economic venture with North Korea as part of broader economic largesse to Pyongyang. Kaesong was a South Korean attempt to provide massive economic benefits in order to induce North Korea to implement economic and political reform and moderate its foreign policy. The economic experiment failed.
Doing so, however, would likely be a violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions.
U.N. Resolution 2094 (paragraphs 11-15) requires U.N. member states to prevent financial services that could contribute to North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.
U.N. Resolution 2321 (paragraph 32) goes even further in restricting economic ventures with North Korea, prohibiting any financial support to Pyongyang unless it is specifically approved in advance by the U.N. 1718 Committee.
Moon will more eagerly engage with and offer economic inducements to North Korea at a time when the United States and international community are more rigorously implementing U.N. sanctions and enforcing U.S. law.
If the U.S. and South Korea end up pursuing divergent policies, it may undermine efforts to pressure Pyongyang and will increase the potential for friction within the U.S.-South Korea alliance.
In addition, Moon has also promised to renegotiate South Korea’s 2015 agreement with Japan on “comfort women” (referring to women who were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese in World War II). Doing so will only increase strains in that relationship.
Keeping Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo all pulling in the same direction to address common threats will require deft diplomacy as the new South Korean president and President Donald Trump fill their administrations and formulate policies.
The path ahead could be rough, but North Korea and China will undoubtedly act in their typical confrontational way, which will remind South Korea of who its true friend and protector is.
Commentary by Bruce Klingner. Originally published at The Daily Signal. The Daily Signal depends on the support of readers like you. Donate now
While the election featured the usual struggle between a conservative market-based growth strategy and liberal redistributionism, voters this time were driven in large part by a desire to end their nation’s endemic political corruption.
After 10 years of conservative presidency—South Korean presidents serve a single five-year term—it seemed a foregone conclusion this year that the pendulum would swing to a liberal candidate.
This natural trend was reinforced by the impeachment of conservative President Park Geun-hye, who abused her power by colluding with a friend to fleece the country’s large conglomerates.
Moon Jae-in, a left-of-center candidate, handily won the election. He previously served as chief of staff to President Roh Moo-hyun, whose term was marked by tense relations with Washington over policy differences on North Korea, as well as Roh’s demand for more autonomy in the alliance.
During the campaign, Moon tacked to the center on national security issues to gain conservative votes, but it remains uncertain how he will actually implement his foreign and security policies.
He has described himself as “America’s friend” and said that the U.S. alliance is the “most important foundation for our diplomacy and national security.”
Yet Moon also advocates being able to “say no to the Americans,” strengthening South Korea’s independent defense capabilities, and regaining wartime operational control of South Korean military forces from the United States. Currently, control of South Korean military forces will be turned over to the U.N. commander (always a U.S. general) when the two presidents decide a state of war exists.
He called for South Korea to “take the lead” on Korean matters rather than taking a back seat as the U.S. and China discuss North Korean policy.
Moon is no doubt looking to resurrect many of Roh’s liberal policies, yet North Korea’s increased belligerence since Roh’s presidency may constrain how vigorously he pursues unconditional engagement with Pyongyang.
Some South Korean experts believe North Korea’s hostile actions in recent years—its development and testing of nuclear weapons, its attacks on South Korea in 2010, and its recent assassination of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s half brother—have erected a “wall” that will prevent Moon from moving too far left.
Other pundits reject that out of hand, saying that “if a wall exists, Moon will jump over it or dig under it so he can be as far left as Roh.”
While Moon originally opposed the U.S. deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense system in South Korea, he shifted during the campaign to sitting on the fence, saying he was “open to both possibilities” (of deploying or withdrawing THAAD) and would “pass the issue to the next government.”
He favors maintaining South Korea’s own missile defense system independently from the broader allied network.
Moon sees economic engagement with North Korea as a means of bringing the north back to the negotiating table and eventually achieving “economic unification” of the two Koreas. Rather than making North Korea make the first concession to resume denuclearization negotiations, he said he would “try to make both North Korea and the U.S. act simultaneously.”
Moon also advocates reopening the Kaesong joint economic venture with North Korea as part of broader economic largesse to Pyongyang. Kaesong was a South Korean attempt to provide massive economic benefits in order to induce North Korea to implement economic and political reform and moderate its foreign policy. The economic experiment failed.
Doing so, however, would likely be a violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions.
U.N. Resolution 2094 (paragraphs 11-15) requires U.N. member states to prevent financial services that could contribute to North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.
U.N. Resolution 2321 (paragraph 32) goes even further in restricting economic ventures with North Korea, prohibiting any financial support to Pyongyang unless it is specifically approved in advance by the U.N. 1718 Committee.
Moon will more eagerly engage with and offer economic inducements to North Korea at a time when the United States and international community are more rigorously implementing U.N. sanctions and enforcing U.S. law.
If the U.S. and South Korea end up pursuing divergent policies, it may undermine efforts to pressure Pyongyang and will increase the potential for friction within the U.S.-South Korea alliance.
In addition, Moon has also promised to renegotiate South Korea’s 2015 agreement with Japan on “comfort women” (referring to women who were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese in World War II). Doing so will only increase strains in that relationship.
Keeping Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo all pulling in the same direction to address common threats will require deft diplomacy as the new South Korean president and President Donald Trump fill their administrations and formulate policies.
The path ahead could be rough, but North Korea and China will undoubtedly act in their typical confrontational way, which will remind South Korea of who its true friend and protector is.
Commentary by Bruce Klingner. Originally published at The Daily Signal. The Daily Signal depends on the support of readers like you. Donate now







President Donald Trump has promised to make a “big decision” in the next two weeks on the Paris climate accord after promising to “cancel” the agreement during the campaign last year.
Fundamentally, the Paris Agreement is a costly and ineffective approach to addressing global warming. There are compelling economic, environmental, and legal reasons for Trump to make good on his campaign promise, and the commonly heard arguments for remaining in the agreement do not pass muster.
The Paris Agreement, signed by more than 170 countries, aims to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.
The means of accomplishing this goal largely center on reducing carbon dioxide emissions by transitioning the global energy economy away from affordable, dependable conventional sources of energy.
Countries involved in the agreement each submitted nationally determined contributions, setting their respective obligations for keeping temperatures in check.
As a member nation, the U.S. also submitted its goals under the Obama administration. The domestic regulations listed by the Obama administration aimed to reduce greenhouse gas levels across the entire economy by 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by the year 2025.
The U.S. regulations alone would increase energy costs for U.S. families and businesses, causing an overall average shortfall of nearly 400,000 jobs and total income loss of more than $20,000 for a family of four by the year 2035.
Compliance with the Paris Agreement will cost the global economy trillions of dollars over the next 80 years. Yet the results will be almost zero reduction in projected warming, even if every country met their respective carbon dioxide reduction targets as promised under the agreement.
Even former Secretary of State John Kerry made some revealing claimsregarding the ineffectiveness of Paris:
The emissions targets are not legally binding, and Trump has already issued executive orders calling on his agencies to unwind some of the domestic regulations that are part of the U.S. national domestic contribution.
Some of those who recognize the failings of the Paris agreement and the significant costs of the regulations nonetheless argue that it is better to remain in the agreement and have a seat at the table, since there are no repercussions for failing to meet the targets.
They believe that withdrawal could have damaging diplomatic ramifications and cede leadership to other countries.
But even if Trump eliminates all of the domestic regulations, there are still significant costs for remaining in Paris. Chief among those costs are legal risks, a ceding of leadership to other countries, and various forms of cronyism.
Legal Risks
Remaining in the Paris Agreement while failing to the Obama administration’s pledges would give environmental activists new arguments in their inevitable legal challenges to Trump’s domestic energy agenda.
As Heritage Foundation legal scholar Alden Abbott recently explained, even if environmental activists’ challenges fail in court (as they should):
Ceding Leadership
Withdrawing from the Paris Agreement will be met with consternation from foreign leaders, but that certainly doesn’t make it a bad decision.
The reality is that the United States is, and will remain, a global superpower. Withdrawal from Paris will not change that. In fact, it will fortify it by demonstrating that the U.S. is willing and able to resist diplomatic pressure in order to protect American interests.
The only way to truly protect American interests is to withdrawal from the agreement altogether.
Withdrawing will also prevent future administrations from using the existing U.N. framework to avoid getting the Senate’s advice and consent in the treaty process, which is what President Barack Obama did in the Paris Agreement.
Furthermore, history has shown that refusal to join international climate commitments in the past did not cripple relationships with foreign countries.
For instance, despite strong pressure from the U.N. and European governments, President George W. Bush did not ratify or implement the Kyoto Protocol, in which 37 industrialized countries committed to legally binding cuts in greenhouse gas emissions.
Although criticism was loud, the Bush administration was able to overcome it and successfully work with other governments on numerous international issues of mutual concern. The same will hold true for the Trump administration.
Catering to Special Interests and Big Business
The media is spinning a narrative that Paris is different from past international climate negotiations because businesses and investors support international action on global warming—even industries like big oil and big coal.
But it is nothing new for big business to support policies that, at first glance, seem to be against their business interests.
Just as industry has thrown its support behind cap-and-trade legislation or a carbon tax, special interests within industry will inevitably help craft a policy in which their bottom line is protected—or at least hurt less than their competitors.
For instance, the American Enterprise Institute’s Tim Carney writes,
Furthermore, there is a giant pot of taxpayer money available from the Green Climate Fund for the taking.
Negotiating a deal that may protect certain industries with subsidies and carve outs will only continue to leave American taxpayers and energy consumers exposed to harmful international climate policies.
The bottom line is that this international framework for addressing global warming is a costly and ineffective approach, and the alleged diplomatic costs of leaving the Paris Agreement—and the benefits of staying—have been far exaggerated.
Trump should now make good on his promise and withdraw.
Commentary by Nicolas Loris and Brett Schaefer. Originally published at The Daily Signal. The Daily Signal depends on the support of readers like you. Donate now